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Abstract: This paper, part of a larger work on international law theory, sketches some early 
lines of inquiry towards a theoretical understanding of international environmental law.  
As the body of international law regulating human interaction with the natural world, one 
might expect this branch of law to be a cornerstone of the international system. Yet in practice, 
international environmental law’s reach is strikingly circumscribed. Little of the governance of 
natural resources, for example, is ‘environmental’. Subsisting at the periphery, environmental 
law focuses on conserving particular (rare, exotic) species and ‘ecosystems’, and curbing certain 
kinds of pollution. Its principles are vague, peppering the margins of rulings within other 
judicial fora: it is quintessential soft law.  
In this paper, we suggest that international environmental law’s dilemmas are due to two 
competing heritages. On one hand, this law enshrines the peculiar pantheism of the European 
romantic period, positing the ‘natural world’ as sacred, inviolable, redemptive. On the other, its 
main antecedents are found in colonial era practices, which provided the data for the earliest 
environmental science and a laboratory for prototypical attempts at conservation and 
sustainable development. Caught between irreconcilable demands, international environmental 
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‘[T]he idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed,  
an extraordinary amount of human history’  






International environmental law raises a paradox. As the body of international law 
that regulates ‘the environment’, one might expect international environmental law 
to be a cornerstone of the international legal system. What, after all, is more 
fundamental to the constitution of the world than the human relation to nature? 
And yet it is striking how little international environmental law does, in fact, 
regulate. The global food regime, for example, mostly escapes it: agricultural 
practices and the slaughter of animals for food (or otherwise) are largely beyond 
its remit. Those phenomena referred to as ‘natural resources’ are generally 
managed under separate headers or, more often, private arrangements. 
Instead we find international environmental law at the margins of these 
concerns, dealing with the ‘conservation’ of certain plants, certain animals, certain 
‘ecosystems’.1 Marginalia complemented by effluvia: as a matter of treaty law, 
international environmental law also aims to curb certain forms of pollution.2 In 
keeping with this general peripherality, the key environmental cases have arisen at 
the edges of other bodies of law.3 International environmental law is generally 
characterised as quintessential ‘soft law’: general principles and aspirational treaties 
with weak or exhortatory compliance mechanisms, often dependent on other 
disciplines altogether—science and economics—for direction and legitimacy.4 At 
the same time, the problems it is called upon to deal with are immense, frequently 
catastrophic, and global in nature: climate change, species extinction, increasing 
desert, disappearing rainforest.5  
Despite or because of all this, international environmental law, more than 
most bodies of law, has many of the trappings of a faith. It derives its effect largely 
from its affect: international environmental law stages a kind of global moral 
authority, premised on an aesthetic ideal and an ethical disquiet. For its acolytes, 
its essence lies in a series of general principles: the do-no-harm principle, the 
precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, the principles of equity and 
                                                     
1 E.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973): Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). 
2 E.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979), the London Convention (1972), the Basel 
Convention (1989), UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). 
3 At the WTO: EC—Asbestos, US—Gasoline, US—Shrimp, EC—Hormones, Canada—Autos, EC—Biotech, 
EC—Retreaded Tyres; at the ECtHR: López Ostra v. Spain, Öneryıldız v. Turkey, Budayeva and Ors. v. Russia, 
Fadeyeva v. Russia; at the ICJ: the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills cases.  
4 E.g., Sands and Peel (2012), ch.5; Birnie et al. (2009), ch.4.  
5 UN Convention to Combat Desertification (1992); International Tropical Timber Agreement (2006). 
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‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, and of course the über-principle: 
‘sustainable development’. Interposed into the practices of international commerce 
and diplomacy, as its advocates demand, these principles promise radical reshaping 
of ‘business-as-usual’. In vain, it seems: for, again more than most areas of 
international law, this is law crying in the wilderness.  
The little sustained theoretical attention this body of law has attracted to date 
has concentrated in the main on its relationship with property law—posited as one 
of mutual constraint.6 While we touch on this important question, in this chapter 
we direct our principal focus elsewhere, situating international environmental law 
with regard to the constituent conceptual elements that generate its specific energy 
and propel its contradictions today. We find this energy and tension in two 
principal historical sources: first, the romantic movement of the late 
eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries; second the evolution of colonial governance 
practices through to the mid-twentieth century.  
As to the first of these, it is through romantic philosophy and poetry that 
contemporary ideas about ‘nature’ became firmly established. This influential 
movement, as political as it was artistic, implanted lasting notions of the beauty of 
‘unspoilt’ wilderness, imbued with a profound moral significance, that have 
endured to the present and provide the ideational backdrop specific to this body 
of international law, as we will show. In this venture, we will be aided by what is 
by now a significant body of work investigating the intellectual origins of modern 
environmentalism.7  
As to the second source, from the outset, administrators in colonial territories 
found themselves grappling with concrete questions on the management of 
territorial, natural, and livestock resources. These included: a demand for 
immediate returns on the significant investments of colonial enterprise; a belated 
preservationist impulse emerging from the burgeoning aestheticisation of colonial 
landscapes; and a drive to ensure sustainable long-term access to the resources that 
increasingly fuelled a global economy. In examining the competing discourses of 
colonial resource management, we will be drawing on a second literature that has 
recently flowered: that of environmental history.8  
In this chapter, therefore, we will tentatively open up some new theoretical 
perspectives on a body of law that (perhaps surprisingly for such an 
epistemologically rich subject) has been subjected to little theoretical speculation.9 
After this introduction, we begin by posing a question of terminology—why 
‘international environmental law’? Then, following sections on the romantics and 
the colonials, we return to the present in our conclusion to show how 
international environmental law’s origins in the confluence of the romantic and 
                                                     
6 Coyle and Morrow (2004).  
7 Bate (1991); Buell (1995); Coupe, ed. (2000); Garrard (2012); Oelschlager (1993); Thomas (1983); 
Williams (1973).  
8 Grove (1995); Beinart and Hughes, eds (2007); Hutchings (2009); Walsham (2011); Thorsheim (2006); 
Crosby (1986).  
9 But see the contributions to Philippopolous-Mihalopolous, ed. (2011). 
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the colonial explains the apparent mismatch between its ambitious stated 
objectives and its muted regulatory provisions—and how this tension continues to 




II. WHY ‘INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL’ LAW? 
 
‘International environmental law’ is not, at first glance, a body of law dealing with 
an ‘international environment’ (for what would this be?) but a branch of 
‘international law’ dealing with ‘the environment’. After all, an ‘environment’ 
presumes a specific locality, a surround.10 ‘Environmental law’ would then be the 
law relevant to, in the words of the OED, ‘[t]he physical surroundings or 
conditions in which a person or other organism lives, develops, etc. […]’,11 i.e., a 
somewhere. As such, it enters a context already steeped in law: at the margins of a 
property law whose excesses it potentially curtails and whose conflicts it 
mediates.12 Abstracted to the international plane, however, ‘environmental law’ is 
unavoidably delocalised—the law now relates to ‘the environment’ in a second 
sense provided by the OED: ‘the natural world or physical surroundings in general 
[…] especially as affected by human activity’—the law of that which ‘surrounds’ 
us, humankind: our (shared/collective) surround.13 This abstracted universal 
‘environment’ is concretised in international legal instruments such as those 
dealing with climate change (the atmosphere as a global commons) or biodiversity 
(the preservation of the world’s species as a moral imperative): the ‘earthly 
environment’, as the 1971 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
put it.14  
International environmental law is, then, a body of law dealing with ‘nature’, 
as distinct from ‘culture’ or the ‘human’. The sobriquet ‘environment’ is relatively 
new, dating from the 1960s or thereabouts. But what is altered, what is masked, in 
the substitution of ‘environment’ for ‘nature’? The obvious answer—but not, we 
will suggest, the whole one—is that the term ‘nature’ carries too much baggage. 
Whereas ‘nature’ presumably includes humankind; ‘environment’ apparently does 
not. And whereas nature (Latin: natura, ‘essence’) lends itself easily to contradictory 
doxa (both good and evil, creation and destruction, may be ‘natural’), 
‘environment’ is more muted, more technocratic. ‘Nature’ has, moreover, already 
been the site of countless battles—religious, political, scientific, economic—many 
of which are still unresolved today.  
                                                     
10 ‘The traditional imaging of the environment [is] as a thing that turns (French virer) around a stable point 
(a distilled sense of pure humanity)’. Philippopolous-Mihalopolous (2011), 7.  
11 OED (2011), entry 63089. This usage dates to the 1830s, later popularised by Charles Darwin. 
12 Coyle and Morrow (2004), Introduction. 
13 OED (2011), entry 63089. This usage is dated to 1948. 
14 Preamble to the Stockholm Declaration (1971).  
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This in view, a first—obvious but important—observation is that 
international environmental law articulates a regulatory interface with ‘nature’ not 
only in its material existence but also in its metaphysical insistence. A second 
observation is that with international environmental law we are not dealing with 
‘natural law’. At first glance, these appear to be two far distant bodies of law. But 
clearly something significant is at work in the move from a law (extending to a law 
of nations) subject to something called ‘nature’, and a law that seems intended 
instead to subject ‘nature’. Viewed from this angle, there is a historical turn (a 
modern turn, a hubristic turn) in which nature is dethroned or mastered.  
The story of this ‘turn’ is familiar, and goes something like this. In Europe, 
Christianity implants itself within a richly pagan natural world, replete with spirits, 
fairies and demigods that are incrementally rolled and cajoled into Christ-
compatible stories or purged altogether.15 The human in the Christian universe 
was still part of nature (albeit a superior part). The natural world tout court was 
God’s domain, unified and rational, and God—Right Reason, reflected in Man, 
immanent in Nature—was the uncontroversial source of law well into the 
Reformation.16 There is thus a debatable divide between man and nature, but 
plenty of scope for its transgression, for nature to act or react in sympathy with 
human affairs, for man to revert, return or subsume into nature.17  
It is possible to trace three broad articulations of the human-natural relation 
across the subsequent (early modern) period. First there is the presumption of 
man’s God-given dominion over plants and animals, as expounded in the bible and 
relied upon by the Dominicans in the pre-Reformation era and, most pointedly, 
the Puritans afterwards.18 This doctrine gave rise to the tenacious belief that there 
were few ‘natural’ bounds on human exploitation of the earth’s resources—‘the 
brute creation are [man’s] property, subservient to his will and for him made’19—
other than those imposed in civil society to avoid war. An ideology of (‘natural’) 
human dominion over the (‘natural’) world gains force during—indeed on some 
accounts actively underpins—the Reformation, appearing in a stronger form in, 
for example, Hugo Grotius’ writing, weaker in Thomas Hobbes’—together with 
the cognate notion of sovereignty itself.20  
A second, somewhat countervailing, view of the human-natural relation, also 
derived from the bible, was the doctrine of usufruct, with which the pre-modern 
Franciscans resisted the predations and hubris of ‘natural dominion’.21 This 
                                                     
15 Walsham (2011), ch.1. 
16 Humphreys (2010), ch.3; Tuck (1979), esp. 17-31 and ch.3.  
17 Thomas (1984), 75. 
18 Genesis i, 28; Tuck (1979), ch.1 (on the Dominicans); Thomas (1984), 17-25 (on the Puritans).  
19 Thomas (1984), 22, citing the poet-hunter William Somerville (1735).  
20 See generally Tuck (1979) and esp. chs 3&6; Grotius (1625), bk.2, ch.2. Hobbes (1651), ch.14: in the 
state of nature ‘every man has a right to everything’, albeit moderated (ch.15) by a right of equity and, 
therefore, usage ‘proportionably to the number of them that have the right’; in civil society, however, 
there are no obvious restrictions on the right of the sovereign usage of natural resources (ch.18) except 
where the subject retains a right of resistance in cases of necessity (ch. 21). See also Coyle and Morrow 
(2004), 11-35.   
21 Tuck (1979), 20-24.  
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doctrine reappears in diluted form in the post-Reformation era in the guise of 
stewardship, the admonition to act, as English Chief Justice Matthew Hale put it in 
1677, as ‘steward, villicus, bailiff or farmer over this goodly farm’ of the earth.22 It 
is an approach to the natural world that reaches us today in various configurations 
of the notion of trusteeship.23 
With the enlightenment, however—comprising the third view—nature 
(Greek: physis) becomes an object of inquiry with empirically discoverable ‘laws of 
nature’ (physics), quite distinct from human laws. Around the same time, nature, the 
‘state of nature’, is counterposed to the human, the civilised—albeit with very 
different inflections in the principal exponents, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.24 Not long afterwards, as a matter of historical fact, 
modernisation (urbanisation, secularisation, the industrial revolution) alters the 
experience of nature: it becomes something ‘out there’, in the ‘country’.25 From 
whence will emerge a romantic sensibility that values nature intrinsically—as an 
object of aesthetic contemplation and site of an authentic human experience of the 
divine—to which we will turn presently. 
Throughout all this, the relationship between ‘humanity’ and ‘nature’ 
undergoes significant contortion and reconstruction, both as a historical and as a 
conceptual matter. Keith Thomas’s 1982 Man and the Natural World is the 
outstanding account of the former; Raymond Williams’s essay of 1972, ‘Ideas of 
Nature’, is perhaps the most succinct inquiry into the latter. In his exhaustive 
account of the success of the early naturalists in removing the superstitions and 
beliefs attaching to plants and animals,26 Thomas remarks:  
 
[B]y eroding the old vocabulary, with its rich symbolic overtones, the 
naturalists completed their onslaught […] In place of a natural world redolent 
with human analogy and symbolic meaning, and sensitive to man’s behaviour, 
they constructed a detached natural scene to be viewed and studied by the 
observer from the outside, as if peering through a window in the secure 
knowledge that the objects of contemplation inhabited a separate realm […]27  
 
Raymond Williams tells a similar story of a secular drive towards the separation 
between man and nature.28 The ‘problem’ arises, Williams says, because ‘nature’ is 
effectively sliced up into very different entities depending on how it is used: part 
of it reappears in the form of products (coal), another part as by-products (slag: 
                                                     
22 Hale (1677), 370.  
23 For an influential example, Weiss (1989). 
24 Williams (1980), 76; Coyle and Morrow (2004). 
25 Williams (2011), 1-2. 
26 This takes place, on Thomas’s account, in part by replacing vernacular nicknames (such as ‘Motherdee 
[…] so known because it would kill the parents of the child who picked it’) with the Latin binomials 
introduced by the Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus (so: silene dioica). Thomas (1984), 75.  
27 Thomas (1984), 89. 
28 Williams (1980), 83.  
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waste; pollution), while another part takes on the attraction of a pastoral scene (the 
pristine meadow aboveground).29 For Williams, the accumulating ‘interaction’ 
necessitates a deepening ideological split between ‘human nature’ and ‘nature’—
and further, within nature itself: removing ‘coal-bearing from heather-bearing, 
downwind from upwind’.30 Williams concludes:  
 
As the exploitation of nature continued, on a vast scale […] the people who 
drew the most profit from it went back […] to an unspoilt nature, to the 
purchased estates and the country retreats. And since then there has always 
been this ambiguity in the defence of what is called nature and in its 
associated ideas of conservation […] and the nature reserve.31  
 
On this account, the destruction (exploitation/transformation) and ‘conservation’ 
of nature turn out to be mutually constitutive processes. The human and ‘nature’ 
separate conceptually in order to interact dialectically,32 resulting in a split between 
economy (oikos nomos) and ecology (oikos logos):33 the law that applies to our 
dwelling seems to exist in opposition to the reason we dwell there at all.34  
Returning to our present theme, then, it seems right to find the culmination 
of this process in the turn to a vocabulary of ‘environment’ over ‘nature’. The 
notion of ‘environment’ already premises the non-identity of the human and 
‘nature’ in a relational construct that renders the former (the human) active and 
the latter (the ‘surroundings’) passive and acted upon. But ‘international 
environmental law’ forgets—or rather suppresses—the complex history of the 
changing human understanding of nature.  One key effect is to dehistoricise the 
relationship (environmental law textbooks, with some exceptions, habitually trace 
the origins of this body of law to the 1960s and 1970s),35 instead characterising 
international environmental law as both novel and coextensive with an 
environmentalism of (largely) American provenance.36 Another effect is to relegate 
the adjudication of environmental law problems to the vagaries of science and 
economics. 
 
                                                     
29 Williams (1980), 83. 
30 Williams (1980), 84: ‘we cannot afford to go on saying that a car is a product but a scrapyard a by-
product, any more than we can take the paint-fumes and petrol-fumes, the jams, the mobility, the 
motorway, the torn city centre, the assembly line […] the strikes, as by-products rather than the real 
products they are.’ 
31 Williams (1980), 81.  
32 Adorno and Horkheimer (2002), 1, cite Francis Bacon: ‘now we govern nature in opinions, but we are 
in thrall to her in necessity: but if we would be led by her in invention, we should command her by 
action.’  
33 Williams (1980), 84: ‘It will be ironic if one of the last forms of the separation between abstracted Man 
and abstracted Nature is an intellectual separation between economics and ecology.’ See too 
Philippopolous-Mihalopolous (2011), 3. 
34 Jean-Francois Lyotard (1993) cited in Coupe (2000), 135-38. 
35 E.g., Birnie et al. (2009), 1: ‘The development of modern international environmental law start[s] 
essentially in the 1960s.’  
36 Notably Carson (1962). 
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III. ROMANTIC ROOTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
The romantic era matters to international environmental law both because key 
concepts underpinning this body of law were expressed by romantic writers during 
that period and because the expression of those concepts was both novel and 
essential to the romantic ésprit itself. Our aim here is not to follow the genealogy of 
specific environmental law formulae or principles, but rather to trace an 
overarching shift in the approach to the natural world that finds its first, deeply 
influential, articulation during that period, one which continues to reverberate 
through legal texts today.  
Conventionally, the romantic movement refers to a loose grouping of artists, 
poets, and composers working in and around the revolutionary peaks of 1789 and 
1848, united by a set of common themes and methodological presuppositions.37 
While we will focus here on a subset of English-language poets, the larger context 
is transcontinental and multidisciplinary, a movement in which aesthetic 
compositions were conceived as political interventions at a time of social and 
ethical flux.38 In this, the romantics were profoundly successful, at least insofar as 
they provided the fundamental premises of much later thought on the relation 
between the ‘human’ and ‘nature’ and a platform for powerful critiques of 
scientific and industrial activity from both right and left.39  
Three hallmarks of romantic thought on nature have contributed to the 
contemporary constitution of international environmental law: the association of 
nature with the experience of (1) the aesthetic, (2) the authentic, and (3) the divine. 
  
1. THE AESTHETIC 
 
Writing against the enlightenment,40 the romantics pioneered the entirely novel 
idea that ‘nature’ has intrinsic value in its own right. Unlike their predecessors, the 
romantics regarded nature as an object of aesthetic sensibility, infused with beauty 
and meaning and inaugurating a higher state of human possibility. True, the 
advancing art of landscaping in the mid-eighteenth century displaced human-
imposed symmetry and tree-lined avenues on the great estates with ‘more natural’ 
curves, clumps, lakes and inclines.41 However, even there the essential principle 
remained the desirability of ‘improving’ on that which is given—and it was just 
                                                     
37 See generally Chandler in Chandler (2009). The romantic era may be dated back to 1770 and forward to 
the early twentieth century. Chandler (2009), 1; Siskin (2009). 
38 Chandler (2009), 1.  
39 Compare the Marxian embrace of the romantic analysis of human alienation from labour with the deep 
conservativism of late romantic figures such as W.B. Yeats, Paul de Man, and Martin Heidegger.    
40 As William Blake (cryptically) put it: ‘May God keep us from single vision and Newton’s sleep.’ Letter 
to Thomas Butt, 22 November 1802. 
41 Williams (2011), 122. 
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this point that the romantics reversed. For the romantics, nature was the improver: 
it could not be improved upon, though it could be spoiled.  
This familiar romantic love of nature-in-itself deserves a little scrutiny. 
Raymond Williams notes that it begins in awe-filled descriptions of the Alps 
shifting from (typically, in the 1600s) ‘strange horrid and fearful crags and tracts’ 
or ‘ruins upon ruins in monstrous heaps’42 to (Coleridge in 1802) ‘motionless 
torrents […] glorious as the Gates of Heaven beneath the keen full moon’.43 So in 
addition to the revision of the ‘pastoral’—the old literary form representing 
tranquil human coexistence with nature44—in the hands of these ‘nature poets’ 
(itself a new term of art) and artists, there is the valorisation of something new: 
‘wilderness’:  
 
‘Lo! The dwindled woods and meadows 
What a vast abyss is there!’45  
 
The admiration of nature in its own right was fundamental to the romantic ethos. 
For as Williams notes,46 what begins as a mere ‘alteration of taste’, an appreciation, 
among the discerning, for the ‘picture-esque’, was pushed in the hands of the 
romantics to become an entirely new sensibility—in Wordsworth’s words: 
 
[…] some new sense  
Of exquisite regard for common things. 
And all the earth was budding with these gifts 
Of more refined humanity […]47 
 
This new sensibility became also a normative source for a radical politics. By 
‘more refined humanity’ is intended here both a humanity more attuned to nature 
and one whose own wilder nature has been tamed through a closer contact with 
‘nature’. Wordsworth is representative of a pronounced strain among the 
romantics foregrounding and lauding the ‘lonely’ or ‘solitary’ individual, whose 
self-understanding, arrived at through (purported) commune with nature, provides 
the basis for a broader and more egalitarian human community.48 So romantic 
egalitarianism would come to inform nineteenth century English radicalism (the 
push for greater social and civil rights culminating in an expanded franchise), 
which Wordsworth himself ultimately came to oppose.49  
Meanwhile, ‘the wild’ as an object of beauty and awe was to have a 
particularly vibrant life in the United States, becoming—notably in the hands of 
                                                     
42 Williams (2011), 128, citing Christopher Hussey, The Picturesque: Studies in a Point of View (1927). 
43 Garrard (2012), 73.   
44 Such as John Clare’s ‘Pastoral Poesie’ or Wordsworth’s ‘Michael’, subtitled ‘a pastoral poem’.  
45 Wordsworth, ‘To ——, On Her First Assent of the Summit Helvellyn’. Garrard (2012), 66-79. 
46 Williams (2011), 129. 
47 Wordsworth, The Prelude, Book XIV (added much later to the first 13 books of 1805).  
48 See Williams (2011), 130-133. See Wordsworth’s ‘Michael’, ‘The Solitary Reaper’, ‘Lucy’.  
49 See, e.g., Coleridge and Southey (1969). 
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the American romantic ‘transcendentalists’ Henry David Thoreau and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson—a more rugged experience than that of the English lake poets. It 
was a friend and disciple of Thoreau’s, the Scottish immigrant John Muir, who 
would go on to found the Sierra Club in 1893, arguably the first environmental 
NGO, and still among the most influential.50  
 
2. THE AUTHENTIC 
 
The romantics set themselves up against much that preceded them: eighteenth 
century poetry and art, science, industry, and of course aristocracy. In 
Wordsworth’s 1802 preface to his and Coleridge’s poetic manifesto, Lyrical Ballads, 
he spoke of ‘tracing […] the primary laws of our nature’, by relating ‘incidents and 
situations from common life […] in [the] language really used by men; and at the 
same time to throw over them a certain colouring of imagination’.51 The ‘Truth’ 
(as he puts it elsewhere) is to be found in the ordinariness of ‘low and rustic’ 
subject matter.52 The solitary figure silhouetted against the landscape in total 
harmony with the materials and processes of his or her own labour is the authentic 
human.53 Wordsworth again:  
 
[…] the sun and sky, 
The elements, and seasons as they change, 
Do find a worthy fellow-labourer there— 
Man free, man working for himself, with choice 
Of time, and place, and object […]54 
 
Implicit in the romantics, in contrast to this authentic existence, is the experience 
of alienation in the emergent urbanism of the late eighteenth century.55 One study 
on the romantics’ sojourns in London—following Williams Godwin, Wordsworth 
and Blake, as well as Mary Wollstonecroft in the city—concludes that, ‘London in 
the 1790s seems to produce, and be produced by, a new kind of metropolitan 
intellectual, marginalised by its economic and political divisions, alienated from its 
commercial values, wandering its chartered streets with a blank, or an appalled, 
sense of estrangement’.56 Here are the seeds of the romantic-inspired opposition 
to the industrial revolution, which continues as an ‘environmentalist’ undercurrent 
into the present. 
                                                     
50 Garrard (2009), 73-75.  
51 Wordsworth (2000), 596-597. 
52 Wordsworth (2000), 596.  
53 Above note 47. Also John Clare’s rustic figures, and, in landscape painting, John Sell Cotman’s 1831 
‘The Shepherd on the Hill’, Caspar David Friedrich’s 1810 ‘Wanderer Above the Sea of Mist’.  
54 Wordsworth, The Prelude, Book VIII.  
55 William Morris, ‘Art and Socialism’ (1884) makes the point explicit. 
56 Barrell (2012), 158. See, e.g., William Blake’s Preface to Milton, also known as Jerusalem, contrasting 
London’s ‘dark satanic mills’ to ‘England’s green and pleasant land’. 
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3. THE DIVINE 
 
In a related vein, the twentieth century German philosopher Martin Heidegger too 
located the experience of the authentic in the romantics, in his celebrated essay 
‘Poetically Man Dwells’. The essay takes a prose poem attributed to Friedrich 
Hölderlin, ‘In Lovely Blue’, as the starting point for a meditation on the human 
relation to ‘home’, combining a familiar romantic brew of art, nature, and 
transcendence, to identify the ‘basic character of human existence’, dwelling 
‘poetically’ ‘on this earth’.57  
Hölderlin’s poem is concerned with how the human may ‘measure’ itself 
against the divine: which becomes possible, he says, through being rooted on earth 
yet capable of sizing up the heavens and stars. Indeed, a quasi-pantheism of this 
sort is common among the romantics in response to the burgeoning atheism of 
the enlightenment. Wordsworth again provides a good example:  
 
But list! a voice is near; 
Great Pan himself low-whispering through the reeds, 
“Be thankful, thou; for, if unholy deeds 
Ravage the world, tranquillity is here!”58 
 
The poem is written during the Napoleonic wars, and Wordsworth finds an 
allegory for transcendent peace beyond human concerns. Nature is, as God had 
been, beyond the fray, timeless, still (that is, returning to balance in time, an idea 
that translates today into the notion of ‘ecosystem’). The same sentiment runs 
through John Clare’s 1824 ‘The Eternity of Nature’.59 Earthly peace is attainable 
through a deeper and more imaginative human engagement with the natural order. 
This is, of course, an ambition we will come to associate broadly with international 
law. 
But it is not merely that God is or resides in nature. It is rather that the 
experience of the divine is locatable only through imaginative immersion in the 
natural world. The experience of divinity dwells in the imaginative creativity of the 
poet in correspondence with nature writ large. W.B. Yeats, the self-styled ‘last 
romantic’ captured the point precisely in his musings on William Blake, who wrote 
a hundred years before him: 
 
[Blake] had learned […] that imagination was the first emanation of divinity 
[…] and that the sympathy with all living things [is what] the imaginative arts 
[must] awaken… He cried again and again that every thing that lives is holy, 
and that nothing is unholy except things that do not live—lethargies, and 
cruelties, and timidities, and denial of imagination.60 
                                                     
57 Heidegger (2001), 215. 
58 Wordsworth, ‘Composed by the Side of Grasmere Lake’ (1806). 
59 John Clare, ‘The Eternity of Nature’ (1824) in Clare (1965). 
60 Yeats (2007), 84. 
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The enthronement of a certain kind of imagination was, for the romantics, central 
to accessing the ‘essential’ truth behind superficial appearances. Fixed and 
mechanised, nature in enlightenment science was dead or asleep under the 
microscope. Observation informed by imagination yielded a truer, more authentic, 
experience of life: the ‘primary’ laws of nature, life infused with divinity. But 
wilfully investing ‘nature’ with ‘imagination’, as Blake recommended, is inherently 
problematic: the risk is that the self becomes sole arbiter of the ‘authentic’. This is 
the essence of Walter Ruskin’s famous charge of the ‘pathetic fallacy’: that 
ultimately ‘nature itself’ is displaced by a symbolic and, paradoxically, 
anthropocentric will.61  
This story of the romantic imagination is relevant to our present inquiry for 
two reasons. First, it is a reminder that, despite regular rhetorical hewing to the 
‘real’, to nature itself, the romantics cultivated a decidedly shaky materialism. ‘Nature 
itself’ turns out to owe everything to the imaginative authorial voice pronouncing 
upon it. So where international environmental law prizes the ‘intrinsic value of 
nature’, the ‘nature’ in question will often turn out to be vague or unlocatable. The 
second point is that the romantic development, from Wordsworth to Yeats, tends 
increasingly to fasten the lone authorial voice to an imaginative didacticism, itself 
centred on a community steeped in a landscape with nostalgic Volk-ish contours. 
The pronounced conservativism that marks the later Wordsworth develops into 
deliberate elitism in Yeats (the ‘last romantic’) and flirts with full-blown 
authoritarianism in Heidegger—arch-philosopher of the ‘authentic’. The 
imaginative dismissal of the human in much environmentalism may, in short, lend 
itself to dictatorial law, as indeed happened in 1930s Germany.62 
In the romantics, then, there is a clearly dialectical move—the ‘human’, now 
quite apart from ‘nature’, adopts the position of audience or commentator, and—
through a new appreciation and awe of this (wild, inspiring, motivating) nature—is 
reformed as a ‘human’ once again ‘in touch’ with the natural world.63 This 
combination—of a human distinct from her surroundings, entailing a dynamic and 
politically transformative relationship with the natural world both for its intrinsic 
value and for the broader good it renders humanity, carries into the key 
documents of international environmental law in preambular language such as the 
following:  
 
Man is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him physical 
sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and 
spiritual growth. […] (Stockholm Declaration, 1971) 
 
                                                     
61 Ruskin in Coupe, ed., (2000), 26.   
62 Giddens (2008), 51-2; Brüggemeier et al. (2005). On Heidegger’s place in modern environmentalism, 
see, e.g., Röhkramer (2005); Garrard (2000), 34-36. 
63 On the human as ‘audience’ for the natural world, see Adorno and Horkheimer (2002), 27.  
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[I]n view of the magnitude and gravity of the new dangers threatening them, 
it is incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in 
the protection of the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value. 
(UNESCO Convention, 1972) 
 
The Contracting Parties […] Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological 
diversity […] and of the […] educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of 
biological diversity and its components. (CBD, 1992) 
 
These invocations incorporate each of our observations above: the aesthetic and 
educational value of nature providing housing for an authentic human life, imbued 




IV. THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
European colonialism was premised on the exploitation of natural resources and 
on the maintenance of conditions of global trade in raw materials. This was done 
in a context of tacit and at times explicit agreement between a small group of 
‘Powers’. In fact, colonial era discoveries of ‘new worlds’ and new natural 
resources were reshaping thinking and writing on nature long before the 
romantics. The rise of the botanical garden epitomised two colonial drives: a 
scientist (naturalist) fascination with discovered ‘paradises’ and the pragmatic 
desire to capitalise on this novelty, by cultivating and commercialising seeds and 
species beyond their native lands.  
There are many examples of international environmental law’s colonial 
origins. Take, for example, the 1900 International Convention on the 
Conservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa64—negotiated as the full 
consequences of the frenzied extermination of animal populations perpetrated by 
Europe’s hunting classes throughout the nineteenth century became apparent.65 
The Convention was itself largely negotiated by hunters; it provides a set of rules, 
categorising animals into five schedules: some (the near extinct, such as white-
tailed gnu) were no longer to be hunted, others were killable on sight (‘dangerous’ 
vermin, extending to lions and leopards), the remainder under certain conditions.66 
The Convention imagined immense nature ‘reserves’ or parks, parts of which 
would be off-bounds altogether, allowing animal stocks to replenish, other areas to 
be off-bounds to indigenous populations, allowing hunters to stalk animals ‘in the 
wild’. The Convention’s most obvious descendent today is the Convention on the 
                                                     
64 This paragraph relies in the main on Cioc (2009), ch.4 and MacKenzie (1988), ch.8. 
65 MacKenzie (1988), 123-128.  
66 The Convention never came into force although its principal terms were applied by Britain and 
Germany.  
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International Trade in Endangered Species, which mimics its aspirations, its 
schedules and its calibration of killability.  
In what follows, we confine ourselves to two representative moments of 
colonial activity, which we take from the eighteenth and twentieth centuries 
respectively. These provide examples of, in the first case, a policy response to 
observed environmental degradation, and, in the second, broad colonial economic 
policies in prototypical conformity with the contemporary notion of ‘sustainable 
development’.  
 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN THE EARLY COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
In his seminal work, Green Imperialism, the first systematic account of the origins of 
environmentalism in the colonial experience, Richard Grove devotes considerable 
space to island colonies such as Barbados, St Helena, and Mauritius.67 Due to their 
relatively small size, he argues, the direct environmental impact of colonial-
supported land practices became evident, and it was also possible to experiment 
with (legal) correctives. By the mid-1660s much of Europe was in the grip of a 
timber crisis, largely due to extensive shipbuilding, itself associated with colonial 
expansion and competition. One response was to attempt to limit deforestation at 
home, although in England these efforts often met with sufficient opposition in 
the form of entrenched rights and popular resistance to fail.68 Another was to 
redirect supply abroad, treating ‘countries yet barbarous as the right and proper 
nurseries’ for the supply of timber.69 Cutting down forests in the colonies brought 
other advantages too: land denuded of forests could be turned over to plantations 
and other uses, and, until the late 1700s, was considered both healthier and more 
sightly than untamed woods.70   
Although the possibility that deforestation may affect the wider 
environment—by, for example, altering rainfall patterns—had been flagged as 
early as the fifteenth century, it was only in the eighteenth century that such effects 
were systematically observed and recorded on islands such as St Helena and 
Mauritius. In 1708, the then governor of St Helena, John Roberts of the East 
India Company, became worried that ‘the island in 20 years time will be utterly 
ruined for want of wood’.71 Over the next 80 years, successive governors raised 
concerns with the East India Company Directors in London over increasingly 
evident environmental problems such as drought, floods, and soil erosion.72 They 
attempted to slow the pace of deforestation, notably with a St Helena Forest Act of 
                                                     
67 Grove (1995).  
68 Grove (1995), 57. For example, the Dean Forest Act 1657 and New Forest Act 1697.  
69 Dr Thomas Preston, quoted in Grove, 56.  
70 Grove (1995), 65-67.  
71 Grove (1995), 112; 109-115. 
72 Grove (1995), 121-122. 
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1731, mandating the ‘destruction’ of a portion of the island’s many wild goats.73 
Their efforts were, however, frustrated by the Company Directors until 1794, 
when the Directors, in a sudden volta face, directed the then governor, Rupert 
Brooke, to commence a reafforestation programme, since ‘it is well known that 
trees have an attractive power on the clouds, especially when they pass over hills 
so high as those on your island’.74 Otherwise, the Directors were later to warn, ‘the 
present inhabitants will afford their posterity as just a reason for condemning their 
conduct as they have now to deplore that of their ancestors’.75  
Of course, timber shortages and proprietary tussles over land use had 
underpinned forestry legislation and centrally organised tree-planting long before 
1794. The specific innovations captured here, however, are: the added cognizance 
of what we would today refer to as ‘environmental degradation’; an acceptance of 
human impact upon the environment; and the appeal, with the Company 
Directors echoing Roberts across the years, to ‘posterity’, a clear forebear of the 
regular invocation of ‘future generations’ that runs through much contemporary 
international environmental law.76  
The Company’s sudden u-turn owed much to a ‘sea-change’ in climate 
science orthodoxy in the mid-eighteenth century—which Grove attributes in 
particular to the English scientist Stephen Hales, a leading figure in both the 
French Académie des Sciences and the English Society of Arts.77 Key evidence for 
Hales’ speculations on the human capacity to alter the atmosphere was found in 
small island colonies such as St Helena and (in the event) Mauritius. A catalytic 
figure was Pierre Poivre, a naturalist, physiocrat, botanist, and administrator (for 
the French East India Company) of Mauritius, who, having developed a theory 
linking deforestation to rainfall patterns, introduced regulations on that basis in 
Mauritius in 1769.78 On Grove’s meticulously researched account, Poivre’s work 
‘laid the foundation […] for the forest protection policies [subsequently] set up in 
both French and British colonial island territories. These early policies became the 
direct forerunners and models for almost all later colonial forest-protection 
policies.’79  
For reasons not dissimilar to the failure of seventeenth Century English 
forest laws, international agreement on forestry management remains elusive.80 
The essential point of this story is broader however: colonial forest-protection 
laws identify ‘ecosystems’—loci of ‘natural balance’ which, if overexploited, may 
                                                     
73 Grove (1995), 120-124.  
74 Grove (1995), 124, citing Council of Directors to Governor, 7 March 1794 in H.R, Janisch (ed.), 
Extracts from the St Helena records and chronicles of Cape commanders, Jamestown, St Helena (1908). 
75 Grove (1995), 124, citing Council of Directors to Governor, 25 March 1795 in Janisch (ed.). 
76 See, for example, Espoo Convention, Aarhus Convention, UNFCCC, CBD, and ‘sustainable 
development’ as usually defined. 
77 Grove, 164. 
78 Grove provides a full account of deforestation and climatic change in Mauritius, and Poivre’s response, 
179-222. 
79 Grove, 166. 
80 See above, note 5; see also REDD+, available at http://unfccc.int/methods/redd/items/7377.php, 
last accessed on 27 January 2014.   
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be destroyed, contaminating a range of resources and ultimately damaging the 
wider economy.81 
 
2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
For a second example, we have chosen the increasingly refined practices of species 
and crop management that developed across the British Empire from the late 
nineteenth century through decolonisation, amounting to de facto templates of 
‘sustainable development’, perhaps the foremost principle of international 
environmental law today—which seeks that ‘development’ should proceed so as to 
ensure that ‘the needs of current generations are met without compromising the 
needs of future generations’—but pre-empting the latter term, popularised by the 
1987 Brundtland Commission, by some considerable time.82  
The case for early colonial practices of sustainable development builds on the 
evolution of practices over generations of colonial rule. Increasingly concerned 
with optimising value in the colonies, by the late 1800s, annual reports to the 
Colonial Office (CO) followed a regimented template: finances, ‘trade, agriculture 
and industry’, climate; legislation, judicial statistics83—later extending also to 
health, natural resources, labour, wages, banking.84 The point was to locate the 
comparative advantage of each territory (given climatic and other factors), and to 
generate an enabling environment for effective specialisation in export 
commodities. With few trade barriers across British governed spaces, each 
territory could export to the Empire as a whole and use the resulting income to 
buy imports from other colonial places.85 In a virtuous circle, the Empire economy 
would grow as each territory developed.  
This empire of free trade was not entirely, however, a free market. Especially 
after 1885, the metropolitan centre was not beyond giving the market firm 
guidance,86 steering countries towards their comparative advantage and generating 
demand for territorial specialities (through an ‘Empire Marketing Board’). From 
the early twentieth century, fact-finding missions were undertaken to determine 
whether individual colonies were optimally positioned within the wider economy, 
                                                     
81 See, for example, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), or the many conventions overseen by the International Maritime 
Organization, available at IMO: www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/, last accessed 
on 27 January 2014.  
82 Brundtland Report (1987). 
83 Colonial Reports—Annual, Nos 260, 271, 346, 353, 381, 405, 409, 472, 633, 695, 773, 881, 1079, 1122, 
1207, 1410. Of these Nos 260 and 346 (both written by Frederick Lugard and dealing with Northern 
Nigeria) do not follow the template. Elsewhere, however by 1898, the template was already in use (see 
No. 271 on the Gold Coast); it was universalised by the early 1900s. 
84 Colonial Reports—Annual, Nos. 1657, 1904.  
85 This assessment derives from a close reading of Colonial Office annual reports, by territory, from the 
late 1890s, through to the late 1930s. On the related question of the British Empire approach to 
(international) trade, see Gallagher and Robinson (1953), and the ensuing discussion in Louis (1976); also 
Howe (2007), 41.  
86 Howe (2007). 
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to recommend steps that might be taken to consolidate their position and, if 
needed, to reorient economies towards new products. The resulting reports evince 
a consistent interest in long-term sustainability: these were significant investments 
and they were intended to pay out over generations. However, once the prospect 
of decolonisation appeared on the horizon, the need for establishing a lasting basis 
for colonial economies became even more pressing. 
A series of Colonial Office reports appear from the 1920s through to the 
1950s, the period when centrally-dictated management of colonial economies 
reached its zenith and began its decline. For present purposes, what stands out in 
these reports is the degree to which they demonstrate a consistent concern for 
creating the conditions for long-term sustainability of the industries in question. A 
report on ‘The Production of Fish in the Colonial Empire’, which we will take as 
our example, proceeds territory by territory to document the kinds of fish 
produced (caught, processed, and readied for sale) in each one.87 For each 
territory—from West Africa to Far East Asia—the report traces the proactive 
steps taken by colonial governments to place fish production on a stable footing 
and to expand it. Accounts are provided of the amount of fish caught, sold in local 
markets and exports, the sophistication of fishing and processing technologies; the 
existence or establishment of research centres monitoring fish stocks; the 
existence, mandate and competence of authorities (Fisheries ‘Departments’, 
‘Officers’, ‘Surveys’); the training available to relevant officials; and—perhaps most 
intriguingly from the present perspective—the possibilities of fish-farming.88  
So a follow-up 1953 report notes that, ‘while the development of fisheries is a 
matter for each individual territory’, ‘fisheries research is organised on a regional 
basis, since groups of territories (e.g., East Africa, West Africa, Malaysia) tend to 
have the same fundamental problems’.89 Core-funded regional fish centres 
employed geneticists, ‘in view of the importance of this work and its long-term 
character’.90 In Kenya, a ‘fish culture experimental farm’ was started to ‘obtain 
accurate data’ of fish yields and to determine the ‘life history’ of two ‘most 
promising species’ in order ‘to control the breeding of mosquitoes and snails, 
which are responsible respectively for malaria and bilharzia’.91 In Malaya, 
‘wherever new land has been brought under controlled irrigation for rice 
cultivation, provision for fish cultivation has been made’.92 As a result of 
‘demonstrations, instructional pamphlets, and financial loans’, more than 1,800 
‘new fish cultivators’ had begun to reap a harvest and by 1952, there were ‘450,000 
acres of irrigated padi [sic] land producing fish as a catch crop [sic]’. Moreover, ‘a 
new form of fish farming, combined with pig raising has been devised under the 
supervision and guidance of the Fisheries Department’, such that ‘the production 
                                                     
87 Colonial Office (1949). 
88 Colonial Office (1949), 8-14. 
89 Colonial Office (1954), 5. 
90 Colonial Office (1954), 5. 
91 Colonial Office (1954), 15. 
92 Colonial Office (1954), 19. 
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of fruit, pigs and vegetables is integrated with the production of fish, resulting in 
economy of man-power, land and raw materials’.93 
Sustainable development is not an easily applied principle—indeed, such is its 
inherent vagueness that it may actually be unhelpful in determining policy.94 
Nevertheless, where sustainability is sought or claimed in practice to have been 
achieved, it is through systematic long-term anticipatory action—monitoring, 
substituting, and proactively replenishing stocks and encouraging linkage between 
different kinds of food production (fish, rice) and other sectoral issues such as 
health (malaria, bilharzia). Of many available examples of such practices in the 
colonial period, we choose fish, precisely because fisheries today generally 






This theoretical account identifies the historical forerunners of international 
environmental law in order to clarify two dominant and competing imperatives 
that drive it. In our sketch we have shown how the broad impetus underlying 
international environmental law—its principal motivating force—derives from a 
particular understanding of the human-natural relation that is directly traceable to 
European romanticism. A newly aestheticised experience of the natural world gave 
rise to highly specific notions of an authentic human experience of nature and of 
the divine. We have shown how a romantic sensibility mobilised certain ideas that 
later find expression in international environmental law. We have indicated how 
the particularity of this vision underpins preambular language in core international 
environmental law texts. But its lasting power remains unarticulated, in the 
promise, hope, and faith invested in the leading principles of international 
environmental law.  
The romantics present the non-human world as inherently valuable; essential 
to a version of human good life that conceives of well-being in a manner that may 
be described as ‘ecological’: responsive to and respectful of the logos of ‘home’. 
This imperative reappears throughout environmental movements of the twentieth 
century, in the direct action of Sea Shepherd, in ‘deep ecology’, in ‘pachamama’ 
earth rights movements. And of course the vision driving these groups is also 
romantic in a second sense of the term, in that it brooks little or no compromise 
with other competing imperatives.  
                                                     
93 Colonial Office (1954), 19.  
94 E.g., Giddens (2008), 59-63. The hard questions are ‘develop what’, ‘for how long’ and ‘for whom’? See 
Kates et al. (2005). 
95 E.g., World Bank Global Program on Fisheries, available at http://go.worldbank.org/0I0GPE15Y0, 
last accessed on 27 January 2014. 
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International environmental law is clearly not exhausted by this romantic 
vision. The second strong lineage we locate derives from practice—the long-
standing management of natural resources developed through the colonial era. 
Colonial practices and conventions are not the only precursors of environmental 
management, of course—but they are arguably the most relevant to international 
environmental law precisely because they are constructed within a transnational 
context, viewing natural resources in terms of global production and demand, and 
managing them within a context of international trade.  
Our first example highlights how colonial rule inaugurated and consolidated 
an administrative capacity for observing and responding to environmental 
degradation, the threat of loss due to secondary effects (foreshadowing toxic 
pollution, climate change). Our second example shows colonial authorities 
positioned over time to understand resource production and consumption within 
the broadest global context and instituting long-term sustainable management 
practices for the replenishment and substitutability of stocks.96  
On our reading, then, it is no accident that the rise of contemporary 
international environmental law coincides with the decolonisation period of the 
1960s and 1970s. The end of colonialism involved the dismantling of a key 
coordinating mechanism that had maintained and oiled the global movement of 
primary commodities and resources, and provided the rationale for a network of 
conservation areas. When global resource management moved into an 
‘international’ domain, as the end of colonialism signalled, it is unsurprising that a 
body of law should have come into being to manage the exploitation of resources 
at the margins and their potential defilement through uncontrolled pollution.  
In short, romanticism and colonialism constitute two imperatives, each non-
negotiable in its own way. Each of these imperatives can be seen at work through 
the key international environmental law principles and treaties. In each case, the 
promise to respect an inherent bound within ‘nature itself’ is destabilised by the 
necessity of exploiting, developing, applying the non-human as a ‘resource’. And 
whereas this body of law and principles is generally portrayed as mediating these 
competing demands, our analysis demonstrates the extraordinary difficulty of 
achieving any such mediation. For at bottom, these are not reconcilable views: 
what one holds sacred, the other profanes.  
This is not to imply that international environmental law serves no function. 
Assuredly it does: it is the locus for the recognition of the sacred in the non-
human world, and the occasion for its profanation, in full view, as it were. 
International environmental law publicly enacts the profanation of the thing it has 
designated as sacred. As a result, this body of law can appear improbably elastic, 
providing a framework for the ongoing (if occasionally attenuated) destruction and 
commodification of natural phenomena in a language of care and protection.  
                                                     
96 This insistence on ‘development’ carries from the colonial into the postcolonial era and into 
international environmental law’s constitutive developmentalism. E.g., Rio Declaration, Stockholm 
Declaration, UNCCD, UNFCCC.  
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International environmental law, then, is a principal locus for the dynamic 
Raymond Williams remarked 40 years ago: a world split into an upwind of 
preservation and recreation and a downwind of waste and destruction, a pastoral 
idyll and a dump. International environmental law excoriates the dump, the waste, 
the loss of life and species—but it is not equipped to halt it, for ‘a storm is 




                                                     
97 Benjamin (1967), 257-8. 
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